German Immigrants and American Politics: Problems of Leadership, Parties, and Issues by Luebke, Frederick C.
University of Nebraska - Lincoln
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Faculty Publications, Department of History History, Department of
1984
German Immigrants and American Politics:
Problems of Leadership, Parties, and Issues
Frederick C. Luebke
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, fredluebke@comcast.net
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/historyfacpub
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the History, Department of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications, Department of History by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of
Nebraska - Lincoln.
Luebke, Frederick C., "German Immigrants and American Politics: Problems of Leadership, Parties, and Issues" (1984). Faculty
Publications, Department of History. 157.
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/historyfacpub/157
Published in Germans in America: Retrospect 
and Prospect. Tricentennial Lectures Delivered at 
the German Society of Pennsylvania in 1983. 
Edited by Randall M. Miller (Philadelphia: The 
German Society of Pennsylvania, 1984), pp. 57-
74. 
 
Copyright © 1984 The German Society of 
Pennsylvania. 
CHAPTER III 
German Immigrants and 
American Politics: Problems 
of Leadership, Parties, 
and Issues 
by 
Frederick C. Luebke 
F or a hundred years, from the Age of Jackson to the Era of Franklin 
Roosevelt, German Americans complained about the political apathy they 
perceived to be characteristic of their ethnic group. As they saw it, German 
immigrants tended to be phlegmatic or lethargic when it came to political 
matters, at least in contrast to the vigor and industry they displayed in their 
economic pursuits. The Germans also appeared to be politically backward and 
ineffective, at least in comparison to the Irish. In this view, apathy explained 
why the number of German Americans nominated and elected to political 
office was rarely commensurate with the proportion of German Americans in 
the electorate. The frequently voiced complaint went still further: American 
politicians paid insufficient attention to the needs and desires of their German 
constituents, and they rarely seemed to appreciate the magnificent contribu-
tions Germans had made to American greatness. 
There was, of course, a substantial factual basis for these charges, 
depending upon one's definition of political behavior and the role of politics in 
a multiethnic, democratic society. Most of the critics took a narrow view of 
politics; for them, it was primarily a matter of voting and holding office. But a 
meaningful assessment of political behavior encompasses much more, such as 
becoming a citizen, paying taxes, assuming jury duty, and serving in the armed 
forces. It takes in any discussion of political issues and the relationships of an 
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ethnic group to governmental and political processes, in newspapers, 
editorials, public addresses, or sermons, and it also includes the influence such 
activity may have on the formation of public policy. Thus, for a German-
American clergyman to take a stand on the compelling issues of the 
day-slavery, prohibition, compulsory public school education, neutrality in 
world wars-or to refuse on theological grounds to take a stand on such issues, 
is also to behave politically. One cannot easily separate political behavior from 
other activities. It is woven into the fabric of life, with all its complexities and 
contradictions; it reflects relationships with work, play, beliefs, values, and 
aspirations. 
Although such a comprehensive view of political behavior is not new, few 
recent studies of German-American political history have placed ethnic 
leaders in such an enlarged social and cultural context. Officeholding, for 
example, has not been studied systematically or with appropriate compari-
sons. There is good evidence that many German-born persons held minor 
political office already in the pre-Civil War era, but we do not know how their 
activity compares to that of either the native-born or other immigrant groups. 
We know also that only five persons of German birth have ever been elected to 
the United States Senate. But that fact has little meaning unless it is compared 
statistically to the record of other groups. 
Another important aspect of ethnic officeholding concerns pre-emigration 
experience. The Irish, for example, had acquired crucial political skills in 
their long struggle against English dominance in Ireland. Accustomed to 
questioning the legitimacy of formal government, they felt comfortable in 
America with the extralegal arrangements developed by 19th-century urban 
political machines. In addition, the Irish had no language barrier to impede 
their political acculturation. By contrast, German immigrants, speaking a 
foreign tongue and accustomed to authoritarian regimes buttressed by the 
church, brought little political experience to America. Moreover, Germans 
were much more likely than the Irish to settle on farms, where isolation from 
political activity was more or less inevitable in the 19th century. In the cities, 
however, Germans generally enjoyed better economic prospects because of 
their crafts, education, and wealth than did the Irish, whose poverty and lack 
of skills forced them to pursue any means of survival, including the political. 
Thus, the Irish immigrant as policeman and ward politician became a fixture 
in our national mythology, but we can hardly imagine a German equiva-
lent. 
Political involvement was discouraged by some of the German immigrant 
churches. The Mennonites in particular were commited to the doctrine of the 
two kingdoms-the sacred and the secular-and taught that, while the 
Christian was in the world, he was not of it. Politics was a worldly snare, 
according to this view, and was to be avoided except in those cases when the 
defense of the faith demanded it. Certain German Lutheran theologians, 
especially of the Missouri Synod, held similar views. Insisting upon a total 
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Fig. 1: Political-A German Speech by Samuel Frey (watercolor and ink, by Lewis 
Miller, ca. 1848) suggests the political isolation of many Pennsylvania German settlers 
who could be reached only by those who spoke the local dialects. In fact, large numbers 
of rural Germans remained outside the American political process because of their 
self-imposed isolation or the inability of party organizations to mobilize them. 
(Courtesy of Historical Society of York County, Pa.) 
separation of church and state, they explicitly encouraged a spmt of 
separatism as a means of preserving their "pure doctrine" and shielding the 
young from the allurements of a sinful world. Politics in America, these 
theologians believed, was hopelessly corrupt; as a group, politicians were 
greedy, ignorant hacks given to bribery and demagoguery. Such attitudes 
naturally precluded any encouragement to political officeholding by the 
laity. 
Another important question regarding officeholding by immigrants con-
cerns the relationship between the official and his ethnic group. Did a 
German-born holder of high political office see himself as a representative of 
his own ethnic group, or did he rise above such considerations in order to serve 
broader constituencies? It seems clear that an ethnic politician could 
successfully adopt the former role only under special conditions, such as when 
his group comprised the majority (or its functional equivalent) in his electoral 
unit or when ethnic group interest happened to coincide with the majority 
view. In the 19th century, Irish-American politicians in such cities as New 
York, Boston, and Chicago often enjoyed these circumstances, but the electoral 
constituencies of German-American politicians were usually less highly 
concentrated. More important, German-American voters were frequently 
spread across the socio-economic spectrum and hence rarely held uniform 
views on the political issues of the day. In other words, the German ethnic 
community, unlike the Irish, was ordinarily so diverse, with its rich and poor, 
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Fig. 2: German Americans supported the Penn-
sylvania German farmer, Joseph Ritner, in his 
several bids for the governorship in the 1830s. 
Ritner styled himself the farmer's friend in his 
campaigns, and early on adopted symbols of his 
German and agricultural ties. (Pennsylvania His-
torical and Museum Commission) 
its educated and uneducated, its skilled and unskilled workers, its urban as 
well as rural residents, its Catholics and Protestants, that unity in support of 
anything or anyone was rarely possible to achieve. Hence, the numerous 
lamentations about the lack of German unity by the most idealistic of 
German-American leaders, who, it is worth noting, were usually journalists, 
not practicing politicians. 
Such leaders understood, of course, that the Germans in America were a 
remarkably diverse and divided group. They hoped, however, that unity could 
be achieved through an appeal to German idealism, whatever its relationship 
may have been to the issues of the day. But such a notion was fundamentally 
elitist in character and ignored the fact that ordinary voters were more likely to 
be moved by practical "bread-and-butter" considerations. This is not to 
suggest that the common folk lacked idealism, but rather that the things they 
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valued were ordered differently. Thus, we have the familiar rhetoric of the 
forty-eighters-that grand generation of political refugees-who were out-
raged by slavery in a republic and whose idealism usually led them to strong 
support for Abraham Lincoln and the newly founded Republican party. Yet 
the common people among the Germans in America noticed that in many 
states Republican leaders were often persons who just a few years earlier had 
been prominently associated with the nativist, anti-Catholic Know Nothing 
party. Moreover, ordinary German Americans, who often had close ties to 
religious institutions, also observed that the prominent German-American 
leaders were usually anticlerical freethinkers or atheists, some of whom 
regularly castigated the churches and their clergy. It should not surprise us 
therefore that a large proportion of German-American voters marched to 
different drummers and voted Democratic. 
The vocal German idealists were also highly critical of the American 
political system and its apparent pragmatic qualities. Despite their intelli-
gence and erudition, they failed to understand that pragmatism was a 
necessary ingredient in the American political recipe and they were too 
impatient or disdainful to discover this truth through experience. Nor did they 
understand that the Constitution of the United States, through its provisions 
for an electoral college, indirectly and unintentionally dictated a two-party 
system. Thus, from the 1850s to the 1920s, from Karl Heinzen to George 
Sylvester Viereck, we have examples of German-American leaders who were 
advocates of a German-American political party-a third party united on the 
basis of German idealism that would hold the balance of power. By 
positioning itself between the two major parties, such an organization 
presumably could force one or the other major party to do its bidding. 
Ironically, the bald pragmatism inherent in this approach was espoused in the 
name of idealism. 
The advocates of this strategy, believing in the superiority of German 
idealism and in the power of their logic, naively hoped to transcend 
German-American heterogeneity to forge an ethnic unity and thus an effective 
voting bloc. But they failed to see that their efforts could generate only 
resentment and disdain among non-German political leaders. An ethnic 
politician who tried to force one or the other party to support the interests or 
ideals of his group could never expect to attain a position of power or influence 
in a major party. Such a strategy would inevitably narrow the base of his 
support. The most that could be expected was that a major party would 
temporarily bend to support the minority interest, but the long-range effect 
would be to remove ethnic leaders from genuine political power within the 
major party structures. 
In the American system, especially in the 19th century, advancement in 
political officeholding was a concomitant of loyalty to party and not to the 
ideals of a minority ethnic group. If a politician worked faithfully and 
consistently for his party, he could expect to move gradually to higher levels of 
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leadership, authority, and power. This system, however, placed a considerable 
strain on the typical German-American politician. If advancement is linked to 
party loyalty, it is incumbent upon the politician to support his party even in 
those instances when it pursues a course contrary to ethnic group interest or to 
ethnically defined ideals. Faced with this dilemma, those German-American 
politicians who chose loyalty to party over idealism were forced to abandon 
strong identification with their ethnic group; those who chose loyalty to 
idealism over party could not win reelection. 
Fig. 3: Carl Schurz was the most prom-
inent German in 19th-century America. 
He parlayed an indifferent military 
career and his supposed strength among 
German-American voters into several 
important political appointments, but he 
relied on his good connections in the 
Republican party as much as anything in 
pushing his career. (Civil War Library 
and Museum, Philadelphia) 
An example of the latter is the revered Carl Schurz. Schurz was truly a man 
of extraordinary talents-a brilliant journalist and orator, minister to Spain, 
Civil War general, senator from Missouri, secretary of the interior, and, at 
least by his own account, a confidant of most presidents from Lincoln to 
Theodore Roosevelt. Americans generally paid attention to Carl Schurz only 
when he transcended ethnic politics to speak and act on issues that were 
important to the entire nation. His idealism led him to oppose slavery, to 
support Lincoln, to advocate Radical Republicanism in the Reconstruction 
era, and later to lead the Liberal Republican movement. In those instances his 
views were shared by countless Americans of reformist tendencies; the fact that 
they were rooted in his German culture was incidental to his success. But 
when Schurz tried to function as an ethnic politician, he was less successful. 
He was elected to only one office-by the Missouri legislature, not by the 
voters of Missouri directly-and he had no chance of reelection. It is true that 
Lincoln and other political leaders perceived him as being exceptionally 
influential with German voters and that they sometimes fashioned their 
strategies accordingly; yet there is no convincing evidence that Schurz was 
actually able "to deliver the German vote," especially among the thousands of 
Catholics, Lutherans, and other church people who distrusted him. Ulti-
mately, Schurz's real eminence was as an American statesman, not as a 
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Fig. 4: Senator Robert F. Wagner built 
his political career without reference to 
his German-American background. By 
1936, when he helped President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt rally support for the presi-
dential campaign at Madison Square 
Garden in New York, there was no 
German-American political constituency 
to speak of anyway. (Robert F. Wagner 
Papers, Columbia University) 
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German American. His effectiveness emerged from his eloquent exposition of 
national issues, not those that preoccupied the attention of the German-
American ethnic group. 
Senator Robert Wagner of New York typifies those German-born 
politicians who chose loyalty to party over ethnic idealism. Invariably loyal to 
the Democratic party, Wagner pragmatically pursued policies that were 
framed by the interests of his multi-ethnic constituency. Throughout his 
career as a Democratic politician, from urban wards in New York to the U.S. 
Senate, Wagner always played down his German birth. Although he was 
interested in the affairs of the Roland Society (a German Democratic political 
organization in New York City), he never gave it publicity. In the end, his 
record of legislative accomplishment as the champion of the interests of the 
common, laboring people in New York and the nation easily exceeded the 
achievements attained by Schurz. One specialized in words, the other in 
deeds. 
Wagner's long political career, which spanned four decades, was thus 
largely independent of the Germans as a special interest group and therefore 
of the vagaries of ethnic politics. Unlike the Irish or the blacks, who were 
united by economic deprivation, social ostracism, and religious discrimination, 
the generally more prosperous Germans had no reason to act in concert except 
to defend their culture. Issues capable of stimulating the Germans to unite 
politically, such as prohibition and attacks on parochial schools, were usually 
temporary. When the threat faded, so did opportunities for political leadership 
based on German group interest. Moreover, the defense of German ethnic 
culture was essentially a negative enterprise. It was usually a q~estion of what 
the Germans were against rather than what they were for. If a German-
American political leader had no reason for existence other than the defense of 
ethnic culture, he inevitably sounded strident, uncompromising, and unat-
tractive to non-immigrant voters. 
Still, ethnocultural clashes were endemic in the 19th century, and the 
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political conflict they generated flared from time to time and from place to 
place, sometimes with remarkable intensity. An early controversy concerned 
questions of citizenship and the right to vote and hold office. Nativist fears of 
immigrant voters were greatly augmented in the 1830s and 1840s as huge 
numbers of Irish and Germans arrived in the United States. Because most of 
the former and probably half of the latter were Roman Catholics, they 
imported a value system that sometimes contrasted sharply with the pietistic 
Protestantism characteristic of American society at that time. Eager to limit 
the influence of such immigrants in the political process, many old-stock 
Americans used the Whig party to attack the status of the foreign-born as 
equal citizens. 
Fig. 5: Anti-Catholicism was the driving force behind much of 
antebellum nativism. German Catholics probably suffered less 
than the Irish, but they came in for some drubbings in urban riots, 
such as the 1844 Philadelphia riot, depicted here, when Protestant 
mobs assailed Catholics. (Library Company of Philadelphia) 
Nativism took on a variety of forms and goaded many thousands of ordinary 
German immigrants to act politically on the local level, where they usually 
affiliated with the Democratic party. The Democrats, inspired by Jefferson-
ian concepts of the negative state and spurred by the Jacksonian rhetoric of 
egalitarianism, were pleased to have immigrant voters add to their strength. In 
the 1850s, as immigration soared to new heights and as the old Whig party 
foundered on the rocks of slavery, nativism and anti-Catholicism became the 
driving force behind the short-lived Know Nothing party. In some states, this 
organization was quickly superseded or displaced by the new Republican 
party. Determined to halt the extension of slavery into the territories, if not to 
abolish it, the party of Abraham Lincoln rested on an ideology attractive to the 
articulate, educated political refugees of the 1848 Revolution. Many common 
Frederick C. Luebke 
Fig. 6: Know Nothings yoked Germans 
and Irish immigrants together as intem-
perate and, in this illustration, as politi-
cally corrupt. (New York Public Li-
brary) 
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folk among the German immigrants also rallied behind this new banner, most 
dramatically in Missouri, where Republicanism was free of the taint of Know 
Nothingism. But elsewhere, especially in districts distant from slave states 
where German workers feared the competition of free blacks, many German 
voters remained true to the Democracy as a bulwark against nativism. 
Nevertheless, the essentially erroneous idea that German voters had provided 
the margin of victory for Lincoln in 1860 became fixed in the minds of many 
political leaders. 
In the decades following the Civil War, the majority of German-American 
voters in most states drifted back to the Democratic party. This was generally 
true of Catholic Germans and, less consistently, of Lutherans. Other German 
Protestants, especially those of pietistic tendencies, continued to find 
Republicanism congenial. 
This division of the German vote along religious lines rested partly in 
differing views about the role of government in questions of morality. 
Old-stock Americans, overwhelmingly Protestant, tended to believe that 
religion was a matter of the heart, not the head-that it was more emotional 
than intellectual-a matter of "right behavior" more than "right belief." 
Emphasis was accordingly placed on the conversion experience and a pious 
life as marks of God's having chosen a person for eternal salvation. According 
to this view, the Christian life was a constant struggle against Satan and sin, 
and as the sincere Christian did battle with the forces of evil, he was expected 
to use all legitimate weapons to vanquish the foe, including the power and 
authority of the government. Thus, slavery should be rendered unconstitu-
tional; the slavery of alcohol should be legislated out of existence; pious, 
God-fearing women should be enlisted in the battle through woman suffrage; 
Sabbath-day proprieties should be preserved by means of a multitude of 
so-called blue laws; and by various regulatory measures, the schools of the 
immigrants should be hindered so that public schools could socialize the 
children to proper Protestant values. Many German Evangelicals, Baptists, 
and Methodists were in basic agreement with this view and therefore in 
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As a result, ethnocultural issues were capable of producing remarkable 
majorities among German voters for the Democratic party in state and local 
elections late in the 19th century. It is important, however, not to overstate the 
case. Pietistic Germans, of course, tended to remain Republican. Further-
more, Christian religious polarities had little relevance for the anticlerical 
intelligentsia and none at all for the German Jews, while urban workers 
attracted by socialist doctrines rejected such notions as detractions from the 
struggle against economic oppression in an industrializing America. 
In general, the pattern of German voting behavior underwent a transfor-
mation in the 1890s. The symbolic politics of the 1870s and '80s continued to 
be important in those states, counties, or cities where ethnocultural issues were 
raised, but in other respects German-American voters responded more 
strongly as constituents of other collectivities-that is, as farmers, factory 
workers, merch'l-nts, mechanics, teamsters, teachers, saloon keepers, or as rich 
men or poor, as ' young persons or old, as veterans of the nation's wars, or as 
opponents of imperialistic foreign policies. This became especially clear 
during the Populist era of the 1890s, when urgent economic issues, including 
currency reform, railroad regulation, and tariff questions, reduced the salience 
of ethocultural conflicts. In some states distinctive German voting almost 
disappeared. Nevertheless, historic attachments of certain German subgroups 
continued for many more decades, even though they were less firm than 
formerly. Catholic Germans, for example, tended to remain loyal to the 
Fig. 8: German-born Governor John 
Peter Altgeld of Illinois drew support 
from German Americans in his successful 
campaign for the governorship in 1892, 
but his political career collapsed after he 
pardoned the three surviving anarchists 
convicted in the Haymarket riot and after 
he interceded on behalf of striking work-
ers at the Pullman works. (Illinois State 
Historical Society) 
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Democratic party, but it became easier for them to be dislodged from that 
adherence, at least temporarily. Independent voting among Germans, as 
among Americans generally, increased significantly in the early decades of the 
20th century. 
At the same time, foreign policy issues increased in importance for many 
German Americans. In earlier decades, before the creation of the German 
Empire in 1871, few German immigrants regarded the governments of their 
home states in Europe with affection. Most German states had been 
authoritarian, repressive, intolerant of religious diversity, and unresponsive to 
the needs of the common people. But many German-American hearts swelled 
with pride as Bismarck whipped the French in 1871 and placed his Prussian 
king on an imperial German throne. Although thousands of Germans had 
emigrated to escape military service, their pulses quickened at the news of 
German victories on European battlefields. A new sense of German-American 
ethnicity developed as the number of immigrants from rapidly industrializing 
Germany declined, and ethnocentric publicists deliberately cultivated a new 
pride in things German to halt the erosion of the German-American 
community caused by assimilation. This movement was institutionalized on a 
national level in the creation of the National German-American Alliance, 
Fig. 9: German Americans generally 
praised Bismarck for forging a modern 
Germany, but some Americans, flushed 
with their own nationalism and forgetful 
of their own bloody Civil War to secure 
the nation, found Bismarck's strategy of 
"blood and iron" frightening. The asso-
ciation of Germans with militarism 
formed rapidly in the late 19th century. 
(American Antiquarian Society) 
which during the early years of the 20th century claimed an inflated 
membership in the millions. 
Such activity came to an abrupt end during World War I. Throughout the 
neutrality period of 1914-17, the German ethnic leaders and associations such 
as the National German-American Alliance worked tirelessly for American 
neutrality, hoping thereby to prevent the United States from joining the Allied 
powers against Germany. Countless speeches and editorials were written in 
support of neutrality, against Britain and France, and in defense of Germany; 
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many hundreds of churches, Vereine, and other organizations conducted 
fund-raising campaigns, rallies, and bazaars for the German Red Cross. The 
effect was to create an illusory image of strength and unity among German 
Americans. Most prominent German-American leaders perceived President 
Woodrow Wilson as a partisan of the Allied cause and therefore opposed his 
reelection in 1916. Among the masses of German-American voters, however, 
there was no such unanimity, even though they displayed a slight shift toward 
the Republican candidate. 
In April 1917, only a few months after the election of 1916, the United 
States Congress, at President Wilson's request, declared war on Germany. 
Suddenly, behavior that had been perfectly legal (though indiscreet) in the 
neutrality period became unpatriotic, if not treasonable. Thousands of 
superpatriotic Americans now believed it to be their duty to wage a war on 
German culture on the domestic front. German-language newspapers were 
subjected to crippling censorship, German-language instruction in the schools 
was nearly eliminated, and all manifestations of German culture-from the 
performance of Beethoven's symphonies to the presentation of Schiller's 
plays-were discouraged, if not expressly forbidden. Innumerable acts of 
oppression were committed against innocent German-American citizens, 
whose loyalty to their adopted country was now under suspicion. In varying 
degrees, national, state, and especially local governments supported the 
anti-German hysteria. For many German Americans, Wilson became the 
symbolic source of their persecution, and many thousands sullenly awaited the 
day when they could punish Wilson's party in the privacy of a voting 
booth. 
Already in the off-year election of 1918, the Germans, especially in the 
midwestern states, registered a sharp drop in Democratic voting. Two years 
later, when Democratic Governor James Cox of Ohio ran for president as a 
Wilson surrogate, the Germans had their revenge. Even though there were 
nagging domestic problems of inflation, labor unrest, and agricultural 
discontent, German voters tended to ignore them as they turned to the 
Republican candidate, Warren Harding, in dramatic numbers. It was not that 
they were for Harding; it was that they were against Wilsonism as represented 
by Cox. Once again, negativism characterized German-American voting. 
Scores of German-American precincts recorded enormous margins for the 
Republican candidate, sometimes at a ratio of 100 to 1, especially in German 
Protestant communities. Even in German Catholic precincts in rural 
Wisconsin, Minnesota, and North Dakota, Democratic voting dropped to a 
third of what it had been four years earlier. In Milwaukee, where German 
voters found both the Democrats and Republicans wanting, they turned in 
huge numbers to Eugene Debs, the Socialist candidate, who at that moment 
remained in a federal prison, a victim of the wartime Espionage Act. 
Similarly, in Minnesota, thousands of Germans supported the Farmer-Labor 
party. 
The politics of revenge continued through the 1920s. By 1924 German-
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American spokesmen became more assertive as they endorsed the futile 
third-party presidential candidacy of Robert M. LaFollette, the senator from 
Wisconsin, who had come to symbolize resistance to American participation in 
World War I. That LaFollette's Progressive ideology was in sharp contrast to 
the Republican conservatism the Germans had supported four years earlier 
mattered little. They loved him for what he had opposed, not for what he 
favored. Party loyalty meant nothing to them; what mattered most was that a 
candidate oppose British and French dominance in world affairs and any 
arrangements that perpetuated the prescriptions of the Treaty of Ver-
sailles. 
The maJority of the German-language newspapers backed LaFollette, and 
German Americans supplied a substantial part of his vote. Still, careful 
analysis reveals that old divisions among the Germans remained, both in 
leadership and voting behavior. This was laid bare in 1928, when the 
Democratic party candidacy of New York Governor Al Smith, the very 
symbol of urban ethnic politics, was simply too much for Protestant German 
voters. The pietists rejected Smith because he was "wet"; the Lutherans, 
because he was Catholic. But Herbert Hoover was also controversial. Some 
German Americans insisted that because Hoover was allegedly of German 
descent and because he had saved many thousands of Germans from starvation 
in Europe after World War I he deserved their support. Others dismissed him 
as a prohibitionist conservative who would surely follow a pro-British foreign 
policy. 
So hopeless had the effort to unify the German-American vote become that 
thereafter most German ethnic publicists abandoned the concept and 
concentrated instead on cultural goals. This was not true, however, of the 
notorious German-American Nazis. Their strategy of blood and strong-arm 
tactics was repugnant to all but a tiny minority and revealed that they 
understood nothing about either American politics or the essential character of 
the German ethnic group in the United States. Still, many leaders of the 
German-American churches, the German-language press, and the old 
established societies were reluctant to repudiate Nazism, either in Germany or 
America, so earnestly did they desire a strong place for Germany in 
international affairs and so deeply did their affection for things German 
run. 
Since the mid-1930s, German-American political behavior has taken on a 
substantially different character. In earlier decades there had been open and 
vocal attempts to organize the German Americans into a bloc of voters unified 
by ethnic group concerns. The German-language press had taken strong 
positions and had argued them forcefully and sometimes stridently; organi-
zations had been created to marshal the German-American vote on a national 
scale. But as the assimilation process took its toll of ethnic consciousness, 
Hitlerian brutality and Nazi excess transformed German ethnicity in America 
into a source of social and psychological discomfort, if not distress. The overt 
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Fig. 10: The German-American Bund staged dramatic rallies, but it had very little 
appeal among German Americans, who recoiled from its stridency, bullyism, and 
racism. German-American assimilation and indifference to German issues generally 
by the 1930s made German Americans poor prospects for Nazism. (National 
Archives) 
expression of German-American opinion consequently declined and, in more 
recent years, virtually disappeared as a reliable index of the political attitudes 
of those Americans for whom German ethnicity continues as a significant part 
of their lives. In other words, German-American leadership has disappeared 
even though distinctive German-American voting has continued in some 
quarters. 
This change became apparent in the 1930s and '40s when German-
American opposition to Franklin Roosevelt and his foreign policies accounted 
for much of what was described as midwestern isolationism. German-
American voters simply wanted no involvement in another war with 
Germany. The domestic concomitants of fighting against one's ancestral 
homeland remained etched in their memories. Thus, in the presidential 
election of 1936, midwestern German Catholics gave strong support to 
William Lemke of the Union party, supported as he was by the vehemently 
anti-Roosevelt rhetoric of the "radio priest," Father Charles E. Coughlin of 
Michigan. Four years later, many thousands of other German-American 
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voters deserted Roosevelt for Republican Wendell Willkie, whose obviously 
German name and whose criticism of the drift toward war they found 
comforting. 
Such German-American voting without the benefit of articulate leadership 
has continued through the decades since World War II. At the same time, the 
Germans have disappeared as an ethnic group in cities such as New York; the 
German-language press had continued its long decline into obscurity; and no 
politician would ever think of addressing his German ethnic constituency 
directly or explicitly. It is even likely that many voters of German descent are 
themselves unaware of the extent to which German ethnic feeling still 
influences their political behavior. Yet careful analysis suggests that, for 
example, Harry Truman's surprising victory in 1948 may be partially 
explained by the return of many midwestern German Catholic farmers to the 
Democratic fold following their defection from Roosevelt in 1940 and 
'44. 
Sensitivity to foreign policy issues has usually explained the extent to which 
German-American voting can be distinguished from that of other definable 
collectivities, especially in the Midwest. In the 1950s, Dwight Eisenhower 
benefitted from Republican gains in German Catholic precincts, where 
resentment over the Korean War was strong. Likewise, other German-
American voters bought the argument of Republican Senator Joseph 
McCarthy and others that the Democratic party was "soft on Communism," 
firmly believing that the Cold War demonstrated that the Soviet Union, not 
Germany, had always been America's most formidable enemy. As political 
analyst Kevin Phillips has observed, such a view conveniently transformed the 
German-American discomfort of 1935-45 into patriotic perception. 
The election of 1960, which pitted the Cold Warrior Richard Nixon against 
the Irish Catholic John Kennedy, carried overtones of 1928. German 
Catholics returned strongly to the Democratic party while Republican voting 
was reinforced in German Protestant precincts. In 1968, however, when 
Nixon's Democratic opponent was a Protestant, many German Catholics once 
again voted Republican. In fact, Nixon's greatest gains over his 1960 
performance came in German Catholic districts in midwestern states. 
Such analysis only skims the surface and tests only the most obvious issues 
and the most prominent candidates. It is largely based on fragmentary rather 
than systematic analysis of data. Although historians have studied German-
American political behavior in the 19th and early 20th centuries in great detail 
and with much sophistication, they have ignored the last three decades. 
Similarly, political scientists have been preoccupied in their analyses, not with 
white ethnic political behavior, but with more pressing questions concerning 
blacks, Spanish-speaking ethnic groups, and women; with basic economic and 
social variables; and with foreign policy issues. 
Nevertheless, the cumulative record of historical scholarship during the last 
twenty years has revealed much about the successive concerns of German 
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Americans as a group. In the 19th century German immigrants were moved 
first by questions of their status in the American democracy and then by issues 
of ethnocultural clash. Still later, as immigration declined and assimilation 
accelerated in the 20th century, foreign policy issues became transcendent. 
Historical analysis also explains why strong leadership never could have 
emerged from the diversity of German America and how, in recent decades, 
German ethnic leadership has disappeared entirely, even though distinctive 
voting can still be discerned among certain elements within the ethnic 
community. A summary view of German-American political behavior thus 
demonstrates how strongly political developments have been conditioned by 
cultural influences and how intricately they are woven into the fabric of our 
national history. 
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